Why DDT is the only way to explain some vapor cloud explosions
Why DDT is the only way to explain some vapor cloud explosions
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为什么 DDT 是解释某些蒸气云爆炸的唯一方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
V. Tam
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文献类型：
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作者：
D.M. Johnson;V. Tam
爆燃转爆轰（DDT）在工业事故中的蒸气云爆炸（VCE）中发生的可能性通常仅被认识到用于非常反应性的燃料，例如氢和乙烯。对丙烷和其他烷烃等反应性较低的燃料的爆炸危险和风险的评估通常基于这样的假设，即在实践中，只有爆燃才可能发生。这具有的益处是，对周围区域的最大危害的大小由任何拥挤的处理区域的物理参数限定，而不是由蒸汽云的范围限定，如如果存在持续爆炸的情况。然而，在2005年英国Buncefield事件之后，在解释发生的主要VCE方面花费了相当大的努力。这最初涉及收集和解释事件的证据，但随后扩展到实验和理论研究两个阶段，持续五年。此后的进一步研究表明，滴滴涕可以在植被茂密的地区和管道工程区域内以相对较小的范围（几米的量级）实现。将对该项目的结果进行总结，说明为什么与所有证据一致的唯一解释是DDT在云点燃后不久，持续爆炸然后通过云的大部分传播。将提及观察到类似证据的其他事件。认识到这些证据的重要性将在未来VCE的调查中非常重要。此外，在用于评估氯乙烯危险的方法中需要认识到滴滴涕的可能性。© 2017美国化学工程师学会Process SafProg 36：292-300，2017
The possibility that Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) occurs in vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) in industrial accidents has generally only been recognized for very reactive fuels such as hydrogen and ethylene. Assessment of the explosion hazards and risks associated with less reactive fuels such as propane and other alkanes has generally been based around the assumption that, in practice, only a deflagration can occur. This has the benefit that the magnitude of the maximum hazard to surrounding areas is defined by the physical parameters of any congested process region and not by the extent of the vapor cloud, as would be the case if there was a sustained detonation. However, following the Buncefield incident in the UK in 2005, a considerable amount of effort was expended in explaining the major VCE that occurred. This initially involved gathering and interpreting the evidence from the incident but then extended to experimental and theoretical research over two phases and lasting five years. Further research since showed that DDT can be achieved within dense vegetation and regions of pipework with a relatively small extent (of the order of a few meters). The results from this project will be summarized, indicating why the only explanation that is consistent with all of the evidence is a DDT soon after ignition of the cloud, with a sustained detonation then propagating through the majority of the cloud. Reference will be made to other incidents where similar evidence was observed. Awareness of the significance of such evidence will be important in the investigation of future VCEs. In addition, the possibility of DDT needs to be recognized in the methodologies used to assess VCE hazards. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 292–300, 2017