Monitoring versus incentives
Monitoring versus incentives
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DOI：
10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00051-9
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发表时间：
2001-10
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
D. Demougin;Claude Fluet
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Demougin;Claude Fluet
本文分析了存在道德风险的委托代理关系中监督与激励的权衡。我们得出了最佳监控的一般结果——在双方都是风险中性且代理人面临有限责任约束的情况下的激励组合。我们表明，如果代理人的责任限额放宽或监控成本增加，委托人会使用更少的监控和更强的激励措施。为了促使代理人付出更多努力，委托人会采取更多的监督或更强的激励措施，或两者兼而有之。特别是，在某些情况下，引发更多努力的最便宜方法是使用较低强度的金钱激励，但要进行更精确的监控。
This paper analyzes the trade-off between monitoring and incentives in a principal–agent relationship with moral hazard. We derive general results on the optimal monitoring – incentives mix for the case where both parties are risk-neutral and the agent faces a limited liability constraint. We show that the principal uses less monitoring and stronger incentives if the agent's liability limit is relaxed or if monitoring costs increase. To induce more effort on the part of the agent, the principal resorts to more monitoring or to stronger incentives, or both. In particular, there are cases where the cheapest way to induce more effort is to use lower-powered money incentives, but with much more precise monitoring.