A Game-theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy
A Game-theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy
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DOI：
10.1145/3337772
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发表时间：
2019-09-01
影响因子：
16.6
通讯作者：
Zhu, Quanyan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pawlick, Jeffrey;Colbert, Edward;Zhu, Quanyan
对数据库和关键基础设施的网络攻击威胁到公共和私营部门。无处不在的跟踪和可穿戴计算侵犯了隐私。倡导者和工程师最近提出使用防御性欺骗作为一种手段，利用攻击者通常享有的信息不对称作为防御者的工具。然而，欺骗一词的使用范围很广，含义也多种多样。在本文中，我们调查了2008年至2018年的24篇文章，这些文章使用博弈论来模拟网络安全和隐私的防御性欺骗。然后，我们提出了一个分类法，定义了六种类型的欺骗：扰动，移动目标防御，混淆，混合，蜂蜜-X和攻击者参与。这些类型由它们的信息结构、代理人、行动和持续时间来描述：这些正是博弈论所捕捉的概念。我们的目标是严格定义防御性欺骗的类型，捕捉到的文献状态的快照，提供一个菜单的模型，可用于应用研究，并确定有前途的领域，为未来的工作。我们的分类法为理解网络安全和隐私中常见的不同类型的防御性欺骗提供了系统的基础。
Cyberattacks on both databases and critical infrastructure have threatened public and private sectors. Ubiquitous tracking and wearable computing have infringed upon privacy. Advocates and engineers have recently proposed using defensive deception as a means to leverage the information asymmetry typically enjoyed by attackers as a tool for defenders. The term deception, however, has been employed broadly and with a variety of meanings. In this article, we survey 24 articles from 2008 to 2018 that use game theory to model defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy. Then, we propose a taxonomy that defines six types of deception: perturbation, moving target defense, obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker engagement. These types are delineated by their information structures, agents, actions, and duration: precisely concepts captured by game theory. Our aims are to rigorously define types of defensive deception, to capture a snapshot of the state of the literature, to provide a menu of models that can be used for applied research, and to identify promising areas for future work. Our taxonomy provides a systematic foundation for understanding different types of defensive deception commonly encountered in cybersecurity and privacy.