Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is it Effective, and, If so, How Does it Work?
Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is it Effective, and, If so, How Does it Work?
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DOI：
10.1257/jel.39.3.839
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发表时间：
2001-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mark P. Taylor;Lucio Sarno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mark P. Taylor;Lucio Sarno
在本文中，我们评估了专业人士在理解汇率干预是否以及如何起作用方面所取得的进展。为此，我们回顾了官方干预的理论和证据，主要集中在过去十年左右发表的工作。通过阅读最近的文献，我们得出这样的结论：与20世纪80年代该行业的共识相反，官方干预可以是有效的，特别是通过其作为政策意图信号的作用，特别是在公开宣布和协调的情况下。然而，我们也注意到，一个明显的经验之谜的秘密，许多干预，并提出了一个额外的方式，干预可能是有效的，但迄今为止很少受到关注的文献，即通过其作用，在补救协调失败的外汇市场。
In this Paper we assess the progress made by the profession in understanding whether and how exchange rate intervention works. To this end, we review the theory and evidence on official intervention, concentrating primarily on work published within the last decade or so. Our reading of the recent literature leads us to conclude that, in contrast with the profession's consensus view of the 1980s, official intervention can be effective, especially through its role as a signal of policy intentions, and especially when it is publicly announced and concerted. We also note, however, an apparent empirical puzzle concerning the secrecy of much intervention and suggest an additional way in which intervention may be effective but which has so far received little attention in the literature, namely through its role in remedying a coordination failure in the foreign exchange market.