Does Retailer Power Lead to Exclusion
Does Retailer Power Lead to Exclusion
复制标题
零售商的权力会导致排斥吗
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12011
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Whinston
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Rey;M. Whinston
本文研究零售商的议价能力和前期进场费是否会阻止小制造商（他们没有议价能力）获得足够的分销。与马克思和谢弗（2007）的发现相反，他们表明所有均衡都涉及有限的分配（即，排除的零售商），我们表明，总有一个均衡，其中获得充分的分布，提供充分的分布是行业利润最大化的结果。导致这种不同结果的关键特征是，我们不限制每个零售商向制造商提供单一的关税。
This paper examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who showed that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.