Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making
Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making
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DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.797
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发表时间：
2006-11-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Sherman, Jeffrey W.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ferreira, Mario B.;Garcia-Marques, Leonel;Sherman, Jeffrey W.
归纳推理的分类主要分为自动过程（启发式推理）和受控分析过程（基于规则的推理），这是由不确定性下的双过程判断方法提出的（例如，K. E.斯塔诺维奇河F.西方，2000年）一直主要是一个假设的问题，缺乏直接的实证研究结果支持它。L. 1991年），以提供收敛的证据，验证双过程的角度来判断下的不确定性的基础上的启发式和基于规则的推理的独立贡献。基于变量实验操作的过程分离来自于通常用于对比两种形式的推理的最相关的理论性质。这些包括加工目标（实验1），认知资源（实验2），启动（实验3），和正式培训（实验4）的结果一致支持作者的观点。他们的结论是，不确定性下的判断既不是一个自动的过程，也不是一个受控的过程，而是反映了这两个过程，每个过程都有独立的贡献。
The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions.