Enhancing compliance among channel members by modeling reward events: matching motivation and ability with model selection
Enhancing compliance among channel members by modeling reward events: matching motivation and ability with model selection
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DOI：
10.1007/s11747-019-00681-7
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发表时间：
2020-03
影响因子：
18.2
通讯作者：
X. Zheng;Xiaoling Li;Xingyao Ren;Zhilin Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
X. Zheng;Xiaoling Li;Xingyao Ren;Zhilin Yang
提高渠道成员的合规性是渠道管理的核心和挑战性问题。基于社会比较理论，我们认为分销商对渠道计划的遵守可能取决于他们的动机和他们感知的遵守能力。为了提高分销商的合规水平，制造商可以主动模拟奖励事件，以积极影响观察分销商。我们的实证结果从一个实验和一个实地调查证实，如果分销商缺乏动力，以遵守渠道计划，制造商应模型的高性能分销商作为奖励接受者，这提高了观察员的遵守通过减少感知的财务不确定性。相比之下，如果分销商认为自己有一个低的能力，以遵守渠道计划，制造商应模型的一个业绩良好的分销商作为奖励接受者，这提高了观察员的遵守通过增加感知目标的可达性。
Enhancing compliance among channel members is a core, challenging issue in channel management. Building upon social comparison theory, we argue that distributors’ compliance with channel programs may hinge upon their motivation and their perceived ability to comply. To enhance distributors’ compliance level, manufacturers can proactively model reward events to positively influence observing distributors. Our empirical results from one experiment and one field survey confirm that, if distributors lack motivation to comply with the channel program, manufacturers should model a high-performance distributor as a reward recipient, which enhances observers’ compliance through a decrease in perceived financial uncertainty. In contrast, if distributors perceive themselves as having a low ability to comply with the channel program, manufacturers should model a mediocre-performance distributor as the reward recipient, which enhances observers’ compliance through an increase in perceived goal attainability.