How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite and cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanisms
How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite and cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanisms
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DOI：
10.1023/b:puch.0000033329.53595.1b
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发表时间：
2004-06-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Schram, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brandts, J;Saijo, T;Schram, A
本文研究了在日本、荷兰、西班牙和美国进行的公共物品线性自愿捐助机制实验中的行为。S. A.在这四个国家使用了相同的实验设计。我们的“贡献函数”设计允许我们从两个互补的角度来获得受试者行为的视图。它提供的信息，在纯粹的金钱条件下，这是一个占主导地位的战略贡献所有的捐赠和情况下，这是一个占主导地位的战略贡献什么。我们的研究结果表明，首先，各国之间的行为差异很小。我们发现，当人们玩“同样的游戏”时，他们的行为相似。第二，对于所有四个我们发现，当人们玩“同样的游戏”，他们的行为相似。其次，对于所有四个国家，我们的数据与受试者只是出于混乱而做出贡献的解释不一致。需要一个共同的合作动机来解释数据。
This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the U. S. A. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. It yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play 'the same game' they behave similarly. Second, for all four We find that when people play 'the same game' they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the data.