A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit
A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit
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DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2017.05.025
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发表时间：
2017-02
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Li-Xin Zhong;Wen-Juan Xu;Yun-Xin He;Chen-Yang Zhong;Rongda Chen;T. Qiu;Yong-Dong Shi;F. Ren
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li-Xin Zhong;Wen-Juan Xu;Yun-Xin He;Chen-Yang Zhong;Rongda Chen;T. Qiu;Yong-Dong Shi;F. Ren
面对繁重的任务，任何一个人都只能做出有限的贡献，需要团队合作。当一个人享受公共产品的利益时，项目的潜在利益并不总是最大化的，可能会被部分浪费。通过将个人能力和项目收益纳入原有的公共产品博弈，研究了个体贡献上限、个体收益上限、所需项目成本和项目收益上限四个参数对合作演化的耦合效应。随着个体层面的群体规模偏好的共同演化，个人利益上限的增加促进了合作，而个人贡献上限的增加抑制了合作。个人出资上限与所需项目成本的耦合决定了项目效益上限的临界点，此时合作者的均衡频率达到最高水平。在临界点以上，项目效益上限的提高抑制了合作。合作的演变与偏好的群体规模分布密切相关。发现了合作者的频率与主导基团大小之间的函数关系。
Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual contribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found.