Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-011-0212-1
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发表时间：
2011-05
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
D. Hirata;Toshihiro Matsumura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Hirata;Toshihiro Matsumura
本文重新研究了同质产品市场中具有非对称严格凸成本函数的Stackelberg双寡头垄断定价问题。它表明，在一般环境中，成本较高的公司可能是价格领导者。也就是说，在可观察的延迟博弈中，这样一家公司的领导要么是（a）唯一的均衡，要么是（B）收益和风险占优的均衡。因此，虽然本文补充和概括了最近的研究结果表明，高成本的公司的领导在同质产品市场的可能性，它也与传统的文献预测的主导企业的价格领导在各种环境中形成对比。
The present paper reexamines the price-setting Stackelberg duopoly with asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions in a homogeneous product market. It demonstrates that in a generic environment, the higher-cost firm is likely to be the price leader. That is, leadership by such a firm is either (a) a unique equilibrium or (b) a payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium in the observable delay game. Thus, while this paper complements and generalizes the findings of recent studies that indicate the possibility of the higher-cost firm’s leadership in homogeneous product markets, it also contrasts with the traditional literature that predicts the dominant-firm price leadership in various environments.