Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
复制标题
进化规范的执行
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Axel Ockenfels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Güth;Axel Ockenfels
Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of "truly" trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.
