The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
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DOI：
10.1086/500278
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发表时间：
2006-02
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
E. Perotti;Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Perotti;Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
在民主国家，政治多数可以影响公司治理结构以及人力和金融资本的回报。我们认为，当金融财富充分集中时，高劳动力租金和银行或大型投资者的强有力的治理作用会得到政治支持。该模型与二十世纪上半叶的“大逆转”现象相吻合。我们提供的证据表明，在几个金融发达国家，金融弱化的中产阶级开始担心与自由市场相关的劳动收入风险，并支持更具社团主义的金融体系。
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the “great reversal” phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system.