Proactive government intervention, board gender balance, and stakeholder engagement in China and Europe

Proactive government intervention, board gender balance, and stakeholder engagement in China and Europe
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DOI:
10.1007/s10490-018-9611-y
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发表时间:
2019-03
影响因子:
5.4
通讯作者:
P. McGuinness;J. Vieito;Mingzhu Wang
P. McGuinness;J. Vieito;Mingzhu Wang
中科院分区:
管理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. McGuinness;J. Vieito;Mingzhu Wang

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本研究评估的管理质量和企业的社会绩效的监管公司根据三个明显不同的治理制度。这些差异涉及船上性别平衡方面的协议和干预措施。瑞典和挪威是我们的强性别包容(SGI)基准,英国和中国分别是我们的中等(MGI)和弱性别包容(WGI)领域。我们的证据显示,在2010年至2015年期间,中国、英国、瑞典和挪威的企业社会绩效评级都有明显上升。此外,瑞典、挪威和英国的企业社会责任评级似乎大致相当。在扩展Ahern和Dittmar(Quarterly Journal of Economics,127,137-197,2012)配额对管理质量最初有害影响的证据时,我们观察到随着配额变得更加根深蒂固,挪威公司董事的教育状况有所改善。在研究期间,这些公司的平均董事年龄(经验)也有所上升。我们的研究结果表明,在一定程度上的适应董事会配额的应用。此外,女性董事会参与的变化对SGI-(MGI-和WGI-)域实体的CSR评级产生最小(强)的影响。中国和英国在这一问题上的研究结果强烈支持临界质量理论(CMT; Konrad,克雷默,& Erkut,Organizational Dynamics,37(2),145-164,2008)的企业社会参与概念。最后,研究结果揭示了企业的社会和财务回报之间的非统一关系。总的来说,我们为制度理论关于股东参与的叙述增加了新的背景(坎贝尔,管理评论学院,32(3),946-967,2007; Young & Makhija,国际商业研究杂志,45,670-698,2014)。
This study assesses the management quality and corporate social performance of firms supervised according to three distinctly different governance regimes. The differences relate to protocols and interventions on board gender balance. Sweden and Norway serve as our strongly gender-inclusive (SGI) benchmarks, with the UK and China as our respective moderately (MGI) and weakly gender-inclusive (WGI) domains. Our evidence shows that corporate social performance ratings have risen appreciably between 2010 and 2015 in each of China, the UK, Sweden and Norway. Moreover, corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings in Sweden, Norway and the UK appear broadly comparable. In extending Ahern and Dittmar’s (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 137–197, 2012) evidence of a quota’s initial deleterious effect on managerial quality, we observe improvement in Norwegian firms’ directors’ educational profiles as quotas become more entrenched. Average director age (experience) also rose in such firms over the study period. Our results suggest some degree of adaptation in the application of board quotas. Additionally, variation in female board participation exerts minimal (strong) influence on CSR ratings for SGI- (MGI- & WGI-) domain entities. Findings on this issue for China and the UK strongly support a critical mass theory (CMT; Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut,Organizational Dynamics, 37(2), 145–164, 2008) conception of corporate social-engagement. Finally, results reveal a non-uniform relation between corporate social and financial returns. Overall, we add new context to institutional theory narratives on stakeholder-engagement (Campbell,Academy of Management Review, 32(3), 946–967, 2007; Young & Makhija,Journal of International Business Studies, 45, 670–698, 2014).