Mass-elite congruence and representation in Argentina
Mass-elite congruence and representation in Argentina
复制标题
阿根廷大众精英的一致性和代表性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zach Warner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Noam Lupu;Zach Warner
在代议制民主国家，政策制定者应该反映公民的政策偏好（Manin 1997；Pitkin 1967）。长期以来，学者们一直认为公民会选举政纲最接近自己偏好的代表（例如，Downs 1957）。问责制模型假设精英有动力不偏离制裁选民的偏好太远（例如，Ferejohn 1986）。但政治家的偏好与其选民的偏好有多接近？它们是否确实反映了公民偏好的集合，或者它们是否优先考虑某些公民而不是其他公民？
In representative democracies, policymakers should reflect the policy preferences of citizens (Manin 1997; Pitkin 1967). Scholars have long assumed that citizens elect representatives whose platforms are closest to their own preferences (e.g., Downs 1957). And models of accountability assume that elites have incentives not to stray too far from the preferences of sanctioning voters (e.g., Ferejohn 1986). But how close are politicians’ preferences to those of their constituents? Do they indeed reflect an aggregation of citizens’ preferences, or do they prioritize some citizens over others?