Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements
Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements
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廉价言论与美联储：不精确政策公告的理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Stein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Stein
本文探讨了美联储在公布其未来政策的私人信息时所面临的问题。由于美联储想要操纵预期并推行时间不一致的政策，因此它无法准确而可信地揭示其政策目标。然而，它可以通过文森特•克劳福德（Vincent Crawford）和乔尔•索贝尔（Joel Sobel）的“廉价谈话”机制来传达一些有关其目标的信息：发布不精确的公告，只给出这些目标可能存在的范围。美国经济学会1989年版权所有。
This paper examines the problem faced by the Federal Reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies. Because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time-inconsistent policy, the Fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly. It can, however, communicate some information about its goals through the "cheap talk" mechanism of Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel: making announcements that are imprecise, and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
CUKIERMAN, A;MELTZER, AH
通讯作者：
MELTZER, AH