Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.776264
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发表时间：
2005-08
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ryo Horii;Tatsuro Iwaisako
本文在内生增长的质量阶梯模型中考察了知识产权（IPR）保护的增长效应。加强知识产权保护，可以降低模仿概率，增加创新奖励。然而，更强的保护也逐渐减少了竞争性部门的数量，而竞争性部门比垄断部门更容易创新。随着研发的自由进入，每个剩余竞争部门的研究人员数量都会增加，但研发活动的集中增加了不必要的重复创新的可能性，从而阻碍了增长。因此，不完美的保护而非完美的保护可以最大化增长。福利和规模效应也得到了检验。
This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.