ARMS RACES BETWEEN AND WITHIN SPECIES

ARMS RACES BETWEEN AND WITHIN SPECIES
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DOI:
10.1098/rspb.1979.0081
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发表时间:
1979-01-01
期刊:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY SERIES B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
KREBS, JR
KREBS, JR
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
DAWKINS, R;KREBS, JR

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一个血统的适应(e)。G.捕食者)可能会改变对另一个谱系的选择压力(例如,G.(一)适应性强,引起反适应。如果这种情况发生得太快,可能会导致不稳定的失控升级或“军备竞赛”。我们讨论了可能使一方在军备竞赛中占优势的各种因素。例如,一个在强选择下的谱系可能会进化出一个弱选择的谱系(“生命晚餐原理”)。然后,我们以两种独立的方式对军备竞赛进行分类。它们可以是对称的或不对称的,并且它们可以是种间的或种内的。种间不对称军备竞赛的一个例子是寄生蜂和它们的宿主之间的军备竞赛。军备竞赛的概念可能有助于减少为什么布谷鸟宿主如此擅长探测布谷鸟蛋,但却如此不擅长探测布谷鸟雏鸟的谜团。蚁后和工蚁之间关于相对亲代投资的进化竞争是种内不对称军备竞赛的一个很好的例子。这种情况引起了特殊的问题,因为参与者共享相同的基因库。种间对称的军备竞赛不太可能是重要的,因为竞争对手往往会分歧,而不是升级竞争适应。种内对称的军备竞赛,以适应雄性-雄性竞争为例,可能是科普法则甚至是谱系灭绝的基础。最后,我们考虑如何结束军备竞赛。一个谱系可能会将另一个谱系推向灭绝;一个谱系可能会达到最佳状态,从而阻止另一个谱系这样做;一个特别有趣的可能性是,双方都可能达到共同的局部最佳状态,例如花蜂共同进化;最后,军备竞赛可能没有稳定的终点,但可能会不断循环。我们并不一定要说,所有甚至大部分进化变化都是军备竞赛的结果,但我们确实认为,军备竞赛的概念可能有助于解决进化理论中三个长期存在的问题。
An adaptation in one lineage (e. g. predators) may change the selection pressure on another lineage (e. g. prey), giving rise to a counter-adaptation. If this occurs reciprocally, an unstable runaway escalation or ‘arms race’ may result. We discuss various factors which might give one side an advantage in an arms race. For example, a lineage under strong selection may out-evolve a weakly selected one (‘the life-dinner principle’). We then classify arms races in two independent ways. They may be symmetric or asymmetric, and they may be interspecific or intraspecific. Our example of an asymmetric interspecific arms race is that between brood parasites and their hosts. The arms race concept may help to reduce the mystery of why cuckoo hosts are so good at detecting cuckoo eggs, but so bad at detecting cuckoo nestlings. The evolutionary contest between queen and worker ants over relative parental investment is a good example of an intraspecific asymmetric arms race. Such cases raise special problems because the participants share the same gene pool. Interspecific symmetric arms races are unlikely to be important, because competitors tend to diverge rather than escalate competitive adaptations. Intraspecific symmetric arms races, exemplified by adaptations for male-male competition, may underlie Cope’s Rule and even the extinction of lineages. Finally we consider ways in which arms races can end. One lineage may drive the other to extinction; one may reach an optimum, thereby preventing the other from doing so; a particularly interesting possibility, exemplified by flower-bee coevolution, is that both sides may reach a mutual local optimum; lastly, arms races may have no stable end but may cycle continuously. We do not wish necessarily to suggest that all, or even most, evolutionary change results from arms races, but we do suggest that the arms race concept may help to resolve three long-standing questions in evolutionary theory.