Conceptual Comparison and Conceptual Innovation
Conceptual Comparison and Conceptual Innovation
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概念比较与概念创新
DOI：
10.1007/978-90-481-3421-2_2
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Harold I. Brown
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Harold I. Brown
本文的指导思想是，讨论跨理论（个人，历史时期，文化）的概念比较和引入新概念必须基于如何确定概念内容的说明。我将在Wilfrid Sellars的工作基础上概述一个概念理论，尽管有一些修改。然后，我将在两个案例中说明这一理论的应用。首先，我将比较亚里斯多德物理学和伽利略物理学中出现的土、水和空气的概念。其次，我将考虑同位素的概念，这是一个新概念的例子，它的引入在化学史上相当有局限性。我想从这次讨论中得出两个一般性的结论。首先，Sellarsian方法为比较概念和引入新概念提供了一套特定的工具。第二，在保持现有概念资源大量连续性的同时，可以发生重大的概念变化。塞拉斯概念理论的一个中心主题是，概念只作为相互关联的概念系统的成员而出现。每个概念的内容至少有一部分是由该概念与系统中其他概念之间的含义决定的。虽然这种观点是整体的，但应该被理解为一种局部整体主义。它并不要求所有的概念连接在一起，形成一个单一的庞大的概念方案。相反，我们每个人都部署了许多不同的概念系统，这些概念系统彼此之间有各种各样的关系。我有一些用来思考扑克的概念，其中一些概念与我用来思考其他纸牌游戏或其他游戏的概念密切相关；但它们与我用来思考木工或板块构造的概念几乎没有联系。我也有两个思考空间和时间的概念方案——一个来自日常经验，一个来自相对论。这两种方案中的概念之间存在着密切而复杂的关系，有充分的理由将它们描述为空间和时间概念的系统。然而，它们可以被看作是不同的概念方案，我可以从一个转换到另一个而不会混淆它们。
The guiding idea of this paper is that discussions of comparisons of concepts across theories (individuals, historical periods, cultures) and the introduction of new concepts must be based on an account of how the content of concepts is determined. I will sketch a theory of concepts based on the work of Wilfrid Sellars, although with several modifications.1Then I will illustrate the application of this theory in two cases. First, I will compare the concepts of earth, water, and air as they appear in Aristotelian physics and in Galileo. Second, I will consider the concept of an isotope, an example of a new concept whose introduction is fairly well localized in the history of chemistry. There are two general conclusions that I want to draw from this discussion. First, a Sellarsian approach provides a specific set of tools for comparing concepts and introducing new concepts. Second, major conceptual change can take place while maintaining a great deal of continuity with existing conceptual resources.One central theme of Sellars’ theory of concepts is that concepts occur only as members of systems of interrelated concepts. At least part of every concept’s content is determined by implications which hold between that concept and other concepts in the system. While holistic, this view should be read as a local holism. It does not require that all concepts link together into a single massive conceptual scheme. Rather, each of us deploys many different conceptual systems that have a variety of relations to each other. I have concepts that I use for thinking about poker, and some of these concepts have close ties to concepts that I use for thinking about other card games, and perhaps other games; but they have little connection with concepts that I use for thinking about carpentry or plate tectonics. I also have two conceptual schemes for thinking about space and time—one from everyday experience and one from relativity theory. There are close and complex relations among the concepts in the two schemes, and there are good reasons for describing both as systems of space and time concepts.2Still, they can be treated as distinct conceptual schemes and I can shift from one to the other without confusing them.