UNBELIEVING THE UNBELIEVABLE - SOME PROBLEMS IN THE REJECTION OF FALSE INFORMATION
UNBELIEVING THE UNBELIEVABLE - SOME PROBLEMS IN THE REJECTION OF FALSE INFORMATION
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DOI:
10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.601
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发表时间:
1990-10-01
影响因子:
7.6
通讯作者:
MALONE, PS
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
GILBERT, DT;KRULL, DS;MALONE, PS
B. Spinoza (1677 [1982]) suggested that all information is accepted during comprehension and that false information is then unaccepted. Subjects were presented with true and false linguistic propositions and, on some trials, their processing of that information was interrupted. As Spinoza's model predicted, interruption increased the likelihood that subjects would consider false propositions true but not vice versa (Study 1). This was so even when the proposition was iconic and when its veracity was revealed before its comprehension (Study 2). In fact, merely comprehending a false proposition increased the likelihood that subjects would later consider it true (Study 3). The results suggest that both true and false information are initially represented as true and that people are not easily able to alter this method of representation. Results are discussed in terms of contemporary research on attribution, lie detection, hypothesis testing, and attitude change.(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)