UNBELIEVING THE UNBELIEVABLE - SOME PROBLEMS IN THE REJECTION OF FALSE INFORMATION

UNBELIEVING THE UNBELIEVABLE - SOME PROBLEMS IN THE REJECTION OF FALSE INFORMATION
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DOI:
10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.601
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发表时间:
1990-10-01
影响因子:
7.6
通讯作者:
MALONE, PS
MALONE, PS
中科院分区:
心理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
GILBERT, DT;KRULL, DS;MALONE, PS

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B.斯宾诺莎(1677 [1982])提出,所有信息在理解过程中都会被接受,而错误的信息则不会被接受。向受试者提供正确和错误的语言命题,并且在一些试验中,他们对该信息的处理被中断。正如斯宾诺莎模型所预测的那样,中断增加了受试者认为假命题为真的可能性,但反之则不然(研究 1)。即使这个命题具有标志性,并且其真实性在人们理解之前就已被揭示,情况也是如此(研究 2)。事实上,仅仅理解一个错误的命题就增加了受试者后来认为它是真的的可能性(研究 3)。结果表明,真实信息和虚假信息最初都被表示为真实的,并且人们不容易改变这种表示方法。结果根据当代归因、测谎、假设检验和态度改变研究进行了讨论。(PsycINFO 数据库记录 (c) 2016 APA,保留所有权利)
B. Spinoza (1677 [1982]) suggested that all information is accepted during comprehension and that false information is then unaccepted. Subjects were presented with true and false linguistic propositions and, on some trials, their processing of that information was interrupted. As Spinoza's model predicted, interruption increased the likelihood that subjects would consider false propositions true but not vice versa (Study 1). This was so even when the proposition was iconic and when its veracity was revealed before its comprehension (Study 2). In fact, merely comprehending a false proposition increased the likelihood that subjects would later consider it true (Study 3). The results suggest that both true and false information are initially represented as true and that people are not easily able to alter this method of representation. Results are discussed in terms of contemporary research on attribution, lie detection, hypothesis testing, and attitude change.(PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)