The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
复制标题
监控不完善的重复博弈中信息的使用
DOI：
10.2307/2297865
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michihiro Kandori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michihiro Kandori
本文件将改进的监测有助于长期关系中的协调这一概念正式化。具体地说，当信号质量在Blackwell意义下得到改善时，在不完全监控的重复博弈中，纯策略序贯均衡支付集被证明是扩张的(在集合包含的意义上)。此外，还确定了膨胀的方向。
The present paper formalizes the idea that improved monitoring helps coordination in long term relationships. Specifically, the pure-strategy sequential equilibrium payoff set is shown to expand (in the sense of set inclusion) in repeated games with inperfect monitoring, when the quality of the signal improves in Blackwell's sense. Furthermore, the directions of the expansion are identified.