RUNNIG HEAD: BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION Beyond rational imitation: Learning arbitrary means actions from communicative demonstrations
RUNNIG HEAD: BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION Beyond rational imitation: Learning arbitrary means actions from communicative demonstrations
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发表时间：
2020
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通讯作者：
I. Király;G. Csibra;G. Gergely
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作者：
I. Király;G. Csibra;G. Gergely
理性原则被用来解释婴儿期望代理人采取最有效的手段来达到目标。也有证据表明，婴儿在决定是否重新制定特定行为时，会考虑到观察到的行为达到目标结果的效率。然而，令人费解的是，他们也倾向于模仿一个明显次优的不熟悉的行为，即使他们可以通过应用一个更合理的行动选择来更有效地带来同样的结果。我们提出，这种看似矛盾的行为可以通过婴儿将动作示范解释为需要获得的新颖和文化相关手段动作的交际表现来解释，并提出了支持这一建议的经验证据。在实验1中，我们发现14个月大的婴儿只有在交际示范后才会重新表演新颖的任意手段动作。实验2表明，婴儿倾向于复制交际表现的新行为，这仅限于他们可以解释为目标导向的工具行为的行为。该研究还提供了证据，证明他们对已演示的新行为的再现反映了认知动机，而不是纯粹的社会动机。我们认为，即使手段和目的之间的因果关系在认知上是不透明的，并且明显违反了理性原则所衍生的效率预期，明示交际也能使婴儿表征新行为的目的论结构。这种对新手段的模仿学习的新解释表明，目的论立场和自然教学法——解释工具性行为和交际性行为的两种不同的认知适应——是如何整合为一个系统来学习人类社会构成的工具性知识的。超越理性模仿
The principle of rationality has been invoked to explain that infants expect agents to perform the most efficient means action to attain a goal. It has also been demonstrated that infants take into account the efficiency of observed actions to achieve a goal outcome when deciding whether to re-enact a specific behavior or not. Puzzlingly, however, they also tend to imitate an apparently suboptimal unfamiliar action even when they can bring about the same outcome more efficiently by applying a more rational action alternative available to them. We propose that this apparently paradoxical behavior is explained by infants' interpretation of action demonstrations as communicative manifestations of novel and culturally relevant means actions to be acquired, and present empirical evidence supporting this proposal. In Experiment 1, we found that 14-month-old infants re-enacted novel arbitrary means actions only following a communicative demonstration. Experiment 2 showed that infants inclination to reproduce communicatively manifested novel actions is restricted to behaviors they can construe as goal-directed instrumental acts. The study also provides evidence that their reenactment of the demonstrated novel actions reflects epistemic rather than purely social motives. We argue that ostensive communication enables infants to represent the teleological structure of novel actions even when the causal relations between means and end are cognitively opaque and apparently violate the efficiency expectation derived from the principle of rationality. This new account of imitative learning of novel means shows how the teleological stance and natural pedagogy – two separate cognitive adaptations to interpret instrumental vs. communicative actions – are integrated as a system for learning socially constituted instrumental knowledge in humans. BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION 2