An Equilibrium Analysis of the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
An Equilibrium Analysis of the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
复制标题
长期护理保险市场的均衡分析
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdab075
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发表时间：
2021-11-02
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Ko, Ami
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ko, Ami
成年子女提供的非正式照料替代了正式的长期照料服务。然而，关于儿童的信息没有用于长期护理保险的定价，因为长期护理保险只支付正式护理费用。首先，我提供了描述性证据，证明关于儿童接受非正式照料可能性的私人信息会导致逆向选择：市场吸引了不成比例的个体，这些个体由于接受子女照料的可能性较低而面临较高的正式照料利用风险。为了量化逆向选择的福利后果，我开发并估计了一个动态的代际模型，其中包括长期护理保险、储蓄、非正式护理提供和就业选择。基于估计的均衡保险市场框架，我证明了在保险合同定价中使用有关儿童的信息减少了逆向选择，并导致每个家庭平均福利收益6200美元。利用模型的非合作特征，我还量化了父母放弃长期护理保险以避免减少儿童的非正式护理激励的程度。
Informal care provided by adult children substitutes for formal long-term care services. However, information about children is not used in pricing long-term care insurance which pays only for formal care. I start by providing descriptive evidence that private information about children's informal care likelihood results in adverse selection: the market attracts a disproportionate number of individuals who face higher formal care utilization risk due to a lower probability of receiving care from their children. To quantify the welfare consequence of adverse selection, I develop and estimate a dynamic intergenerational model featuring long-term care insurance, savings, informal care provision, and employment choices. Based on the estimated equilibrium insurance market framework, I show that using information about children in pricing insurance contracts reduces adverse selection and results in the average welfare gain of $6,200 per family. Using the non-cooperative feature of the model, I also quantify to what extent parents forgo long-term care insurance to avoid diminishing children's informal care incentive.