Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach
Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach
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墨西哥国债初级拍卖中的最优投标：结构计量经济学方法的结果
DOI：
10.4067/s0717-68212008000100001
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Marco Oviedo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sara G. Castellanos;Marco Oviedo
对墨西哥国债初级拍卖的这一分析表明，统一格式比歧视性格式产生更高的收入。它应用了Fevrier，Preget和Visser(2004)提出的结构计量经济学模型。此模式
This analysis of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions suggests that the uniform format yields higher revenues than the discriminatory format. It applies the structural econometric model proposed by Fevrier, Preget, and Visser (2004). This mod