Supplier Encroachment and Consumer Welfare: Upstream Firm's Opportunism and Multichannel Distribution
Supplier Encroachment and Consumer Welfare: Upstream Firm's Opportunism and Multichannel Distribution
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2840667
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发表时间：
2018-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Cong Pan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cong Pan
我们在两部分关税合同的框架下重新审视供应商侵占。早期的文献大多得出结论，提供两部分关税合同的上游制造商永远不会直接向转售市场销售，因为它总是可以通过固定费用提取下游零售商的全部盈余。然而，在我们的研究中，当一个垄断的制造商供应竞争的零售商和合同的结果是观察到的，只有缔约方，制造商与两部分关税合同侵占转售市场，提高利润。我们进一步表明，这种侵占加剧了双重边缘化，降低了消费者福利和总盈余。
We revisit supplier encroachment under the framework of a two-part tariff contract. Early literature largely concludes that an upstream manufacturer offering a two-part tariff contract never sells directly to the resale market because it can always extract the downstream retailer’s entire surplus through the fixed fee. However, in our study, when a monopoly manufacturer supplies competing retailers and contract outcomes are observable only to the contracting partners, the manufacturer with a two-part tariff contract encroaches upon the resale market and enhances profits. We further show that this encroachment aggravates double marginalization and reduces consumer welfare and the total surplus.