Combining Moral Theory, Modal Logic and Mas to Create Well-Behaving Artificial Agents
Combining Moral Theory, Modal Logic and Mas to Create Well-Behaving Artificial Agents
复制标题
结合道德理论、模态逻辑和 Mas 创建行为良好的人工代理
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Berg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Wiegel;J. Berg
目睹越来越多的自主软件代理，我们互动或代表我们的情况下，事先不完全知道，我们认为，有必要提供这些代理的道德推理能力。看看目前的文献行为约束和多代理（软件）系统（MAS），可以区分各种主题。第一个专题涉及分析各种形式的限制及其依据。这个问题是道德哲学的核心。第二个主题是关于约束的形式化规范和推理。关于这个主题的研究主要集中在逻辑的使用上，主要是模态逻辑和可废除逻辑。最后一个主题是MAS和实现相关的主题，设计一个工作系统，其中有规则，可以强制执行和异常行为检测。在这里，我们认为，所有三个主题需要解决和强大的集成。需要进行道德哲学分析，以便对各种形式的行为约束和指导提供详细的概念化。这种分析超出了通常的技术/设计重点。（模态）逻辑提供了最终允许实现所需的严格性。执行本身是最终目标。我们概述了这三个组成部分，并演示了如何将它们整合起来。我们在这里注意到，我们并不打算或声称，这种道德推理与人类的道德推理是平等的。我们的主张是，人类道德推理的分析可能会提供一个有用的模型，约束软件代理的行为。而且，同样重要的是，它是由人类识别的，这是一个重要的特征，当涉及到“人类-人工智能体”的互动。认识和理解人工实体中行为约束的确切基础将使代理更加可信，这反过来又将促进接受人工代理的使用和与人工代理的交互。
Witnessing a growing number of increasingly autonomous software agents we interact with or that operate on our behalf under circumstances that are not fully known in advance, we argue that there is a need to provide these agents with moral reasoning capabilities. Looking at the current literature on behaviour constraints and multi-agent (software) systems (MAS), one can distinguish various topics. The first topic concerns the analysis of various forms of restraint and their basis. This topic is at the core of moral philosophy. The second topic concerns the formalized specification of, and the reasoning about the constraints. The research on this topic focuses predominantly on the use of logic, mostly modal logic, and defeasible logic. The last topic is the MAS and implementation related topic of designing a working system in which there are rules that can be enforced and deviant behaviour be detected.Here we argue that all three topics need addressing and strong integration. The moral philosophical analysis is needed to provide a detailed conceptualization of the various forms of behaviour constraint and direction. This analysis goes beyond what is usual in the more technical/design focus. The (modal) logic provides the rigour required to ultimately allow implementation. The implementation itself is the ultimate objective. We outline the three components and demonstrate how they can be integrated. We observe here that we do not intend, or claim, that this moral reasoning is on par with human moral reasoning. Our claim is that the analysis of human moral reasoning may provide a useful model for constraining software agent behaviour. And, as equally important, it is recognizable by humans which is an important characteristic when it comes to ‘human–artificial agent’ interaction. Recognizing and understanding the precise basis for the behaviour constraint in the artificial entity will make the agent more trustful which, in its turn, will facilitate the acceptance of the use of and the interaction with artificial agents.