Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents
Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents
复制标题
将对象动态分配给排队代理
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20150183
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David Cantala
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Francis Bloch;David Cantala
我们分析了动态分配对象的代理组织在一个恒定大小的等待列表。申请包括分配社会住房和器官移植。我们分析了概率排队纪律，惩罚计划和信息发布的最优设计。在私人价值观下，所有代理都喜欢先到先得，而不是彩票，但彩票的浪费更低。有了共同的价值观，所有的代理人都喜欢先到先得的机制，而不是任何其他机制，并且在抽奖时浪费最小化。惩罚方案加速了排队的流动，信息发布增加了等待名单顶部的代理人的价值。
We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and waste is minimized at the lottery. Punishment schemes accelerate turnover in the queue and information release increases the value of agents at the top of the waiting list.