Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems
Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems
复制标题
混合成员选举制度中的相互作用效应
DOI：
10.1177/001041402237505
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Leonard J. Schoppa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Cox;Leonard J. Schoppa
在过去十年中，混合成员选举制度的受欢迎程度令人惊讶地增长。在这些制度下，选民同时根据比例代表制（PR）和单一成员地区多数制（SMDP）规则选择代表。人们普遍认为，SMDP规则往往会将竞争筛选到两个大政党，来自混合系统的证据表明，这种Duvergerian“重力”也减少了在混合系统下SMDP竞争中幸存的政党数量。然而，我们认为，同时投票PR规则软化这种筛选效果，作为一个“离心力”，防止Duvergerian重力减少竞争的程度，它在纯SMDP系统。因此，这些新系统产生的效果是设计者没有预料到的。为了检验这种离心力的存在，我们研究了精英阶层的选举策略在德国，日本和意大利和比较区一级SMDP选举结果从纯系统与混合成员系统。
The past decade has witnessed a surprising growth in the popularity of mixed-member electoral systems. Under these systems, voters choose representatives simultaneously under both proportional representation (PR) and single-member district plurality (SMDP) rules. It is widely accepted that SMDP rules tend to winnow competition down toward two large parties, and evidence from mixed systems suggests that this Duvergerian “gravity” reduces the number of parties surviving SMDP competition under mixed systems as well. Nevertheless, we argue, simultaneous balloting under PR rules softens this winnowing effect, operating as a “centrifugal force” that prevents Duvergerian gravity from reducing competition to the degree it does under pure SMDP systems. Thus, these newsystems produce effects unanticipated by their designers. To test for the presence of this centrifugal force, we examine elite-level electoral strategies in Germany, Japan, and Italy and compare district-level SMDP election results from pure systems with those of mixed-member systems.