Peer Monitoring, Syndication, and the Dynamics of Venture Capital Interactions: Theory and Evidence
Peer Monitoring, Syndication, and the Dynamics of Venture Capital Interactions: Theory and Evidence
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DOI：
10.1017/s0022109019000218
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发表时间：
2020-09-01
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Tian, Xuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bayar, Onur;Chemmanur, Thomas J.;Tian, Xuan
我们开发了一个理论模型，为风险投资家(VC)辛迪加的形成提供了新的理论基础，并对我们的模型预测进行了实证检验。创业者从一家风险投资公司或两家不同的风险投资公司获得融资和两种不同的增值投入，每一家风险投资公司都在自己的专业领域运营。我们刻画了企业家在与一家风险投资公司、单独与多家风险投资公司或与风险投资财团签订合同之间的均衡选择。我们发现，辛迪加在价值增值方面缓解了风险投资家的道德风险问题。我们还分析了风险投资辛迪加组成的动态。我们的实证分析结果与我们模型的预测是一致的。
We develop a theoretical model providing a new rationale for venture capitalist (VC) syndicate formation and empirically test our model predictions. An entrepreneur obtains financing and two different value-adding inputs from a single VC or from two different VCs, each operating in his area of expertise. We characterize the entrepreneur's equilibrium choice between contracting with a single VC, individually with multiple VCs, or with a VC syndicate. We show that syndicates mitigate VCs' moral hazard problem in value addition. We also analyze the dynamics of VC syndicate composition. The results of our empirical analysis are consistent with our model's predictions.