The Role of Accounting Conservatism in Executive Compensation Contracts
The Role of Accounting Conservatism in Executive Compensation Contracts
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DOI：
10.1111/jbfa.12350
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发表时间：
2018-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Iwasaki;S. Otomasa;Atsushi Shiiba;Akinobu Shuto
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文献类型：
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作者：
T. Iwasaki;S. Otomasa;Atsushi Shiiba;Akinobu Shuto
为了检验 Watts（2003）关于会计稳健性提高高管薪酬合同效率的论点的含义，我们研究了日本公司会计稳健性与基于收益的高管薪酬合同之间的关系。我们关注日本高管薪酬实践，因为日本公司对会计稳健性的需求可能比美国公司更大，因为日本以收益为基础的高管薪酬合同占主导地位，而且缺乏明确的薪酬合同。与我们的论点一致，我们发现会计稳健性与薪酬收益系数之间存在正相关关系。此外，对于事前信息环境较差的企业来说，这种正相关关系更为明显。这些结果表明，对于使用更多基于收益的高管薪酬合同并且存在更严重的事后结算问题的公司，对会计稳健性的要求更高。
To test the implication of Watts’ (2003) argument that accounting conservatism increases the efficiency of executive compensation contracts, we investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings-based executive compensation contracts in Japanese firms. We focus on Japanese executive compensation practices because the demand for accounting conservatism is likely to be larger for Japanese than U.S. firms because of the predominance of earnings-based executive compensation contracts and lack of explicit compensation contracts in Japan. Consistent with our arguments, we find a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and the compensation earnings coefficient. Furthermore, this positive relationship is greater for firms with poor ex-ante information environment. These results suggest that the demand for accounting conservatism is higher for firms that use more earnings-based executive compensation contracts and have more serious ex post settling up problems.