SCREENING FOR BID RIGGING—DOES IT WORK?

SCREENING FOR BID RIGGING—DOES IT WORK?
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筛查串通投标——有效吗?

DOI:
10.1093/joclec/nhy006
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发表时间:
2018
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
Samuel Rutz
Samuel Rutz
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
David Imhof;Yavuz Karagök;Samuel Rutz

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本文提出了一种通过对瑞士的道路建设采购数据集应用相互增强的筛选来检测串通投标的方法,在该数据集中没有关于串通的先验信息。该筛选方法特别适合于处理部分合谋问题,即不涉及特定数据集中的所有公司和/或所有合同的合谋,这意味着相应文献中讨论的许多经典标记将无法识别投标操纵。除了展示一个新的串通屏幕外,还展示了如何使用基准和不同屏幕的组合来识别数据集中可疑合同和公司的子集。所讨论的筛选方法成功地隔离了一群“可疑”公司,这些公司表现出当地操纵投标的卡特尔的特征,以掩护投标和或多或少明显的投标轮换计划运作。根据这些调查结果,瑞士竞争委员会(Comco)决定展开调查。
This paper proposes a method to detect bid-rigging by applying mutually reinforcing screens to a road construction procurement data set from Switzerland in which no prior information about collusion was available. The screening method is particularly suited to deal with the problem of partial collusion, i.e. collusion which does not involve all firms and/or all contracts in a specific data set, implying that many of the classical markers discussed in the corresponding literature will fail to identify bid-rigging. In addition to presenting a new screen for collusion, it is shown how benchmarks and the combination of different screens may be used to identify subsets of suspicious contracts and firms in a data set. The discussed screening method succeeds in isolating a group of “suspicious” firms exhibiting the characteristics of a local bid-rigging cartel operating with cover bids and a – more or less pronounced – bid rotation scheme. Based on these findings the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) decided to open an investigation.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.012
发表时间: 2006-11
影响因子: 1.5
作者:
Joseph E. Harrington;Joe Chen
通讯作者: Joseph E. Harrington;Joe Chen