The science of security versus the security of science.
The science of security versus the security of science.
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安全的科学与科学的安全。
DOI：
10.1093/infdis/jis256
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bouvier,NicoleM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bouvier,NicoleM
制造两种全部或部分基于高致病性禽流感(HPAI)H5N1毒株的甲型流感病毒引起了非常公开的争议。这些病毒经过专门和故意的基因改造，以增强它们在雪貂之间通过空气传播的能力，雪貂是研究流感病毒传播的常用动物模型。一种来自荷兰伊拉斯谟医学中心的病毒被突变，包括已知的3个氨基酸多态，以增强禽流感病毒株在哺乳动物中的传播性。当这种病毒无法通过空气从雪貂传播到雪貂时，它会通过更多的雪貂进行连续传播，直到它获得了另外两个突变，其中一个或两个突变使雪貂可以通过空气传播。由此产生的病毒最初被描述为与导致该物种严重疾病的相关H5N1病毒类似的致病性，并与季节性流感病毒一样有效传播[1，2]。然而，来自伊拉斯谟研究小组的后续数据表明，空气传播的病毒实际上比最初报告显示的更不容易传播，毒力也更小[3]。另一种病毒是由威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校设计的，它从几种H5N1病毒中提取了血凝素受体结合蛋白，并将它们与2009年大流行的H1N1(H1N1pdm09)流感病毒株的剩余病毒基因一起表达。似乎这些H5N1-H1N1重组病毒中至少有一种能够通过空气传播的呼吸道颗粒在雪貂中传播；然而，与其亲本H1N1pdm09病毒一样，它没有杀死受感染的雪貂[4]。两组研究人员都向受人尊敬的科学期刊提交了他们的研究结果，伊拉斯谟小组向《科学》杂志提交了他们的研究结果，威斯康星州小组向《自然》杂志提交了他们的研究结果，两份手稿都经过了同行评议，并被接受发表。然而，为美国政府提供两用研究建议的国家生物安全科学咨询委员会(NSABB)[5]得出的结论是，“全面公布这些结果具有重大的潜在危害”[5]，该研究被定义为“具有合法科学目的的生物研究，可能被滥用，对公共健康和/或国家安全构成生物威胁”。超过了出版的好处“，因此，建议”在两个手稿…中通报结果在实验细节和结果方面应该受到极大的限制。在撰写本文时，这些期刊和作者似乎准备接受NSABB的
A very public controversy has arisen from the creation of two influenza A viruses based all or in part on highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 strains. These viruses were genetically modified, specifically and intentionally, to enhance their ability to transmit by air between ferrets, a commonly used animal model for influenza virus transmission studies. One virus, from the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands, was mutated to include 3 amino acid polymorphisms already known to enhance the transmissibility of avian influenza virus strains among mammals. When that virus failed to transmit from ferret to ferret by air, it was then serially passaged through more ferrets until it acquired 2 further mutations, one or both of which conferred airborne transmissibility among ferrets. The resulting virus was initially described as similarly pathogenic as related H5N1 viruses, which cause severe disease in this species, and as efficiently transmissible as seasonal influenza viruses [1, 2]. Subsequent data from the Erasmus group, however, suggest that the airborne virus is actually less transmissible and less virulent than original reports seemed to indicate [3].The other virus, engineered at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, took the hemagglutinin (HA) receptor-binding proteins from several H5N1 viruses and expressed them with the remaining viral genes from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm09) influenza strain. It appears that at least one of these H5N1-H1N1 reassortant viruses was able to transmit among ferrets via airborne respiratory particles; however, like its parental H1N1pdm09 virus, it did not kill infected ferrets [4]. Both groups of researchers submitted their findings to respected scientific journals, the Erasmus group to Science and the Wisconsin group to Nature, and both manuscripts were peer-reviewed and accepted for publication. However, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which advises the US government on dual-use research (defined as “biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security”[5]) concluded that the “significant potential for harm in fully publishing these results… exceeded the benefits of publication” and, thus, recommended that “communication of the results in the two manuscripts… should be greatly limited in terms of the experimental details and results”[6]. As of this writing, the journals and the authors appear prepared to accept the NSABB’s