Ex-ante versus ex-post privatization policies with foreign penetration in free-entry mixed markets
Ex-ante versus ex-post privatization policies with foreign penetration in free-entry mixed markets
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DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2017.03.023
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发表时间：
2017-07
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Lili Xu;Sang‐Ho Lee;Toshihiro Matsumura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lili Xu;Sang‐Ho Lee;Toshihiro Matsumura
本研究调查了私有化和自由化政策的时机对私有化程度和进入自由进入混合市场的企业数量的影响。我们制定了两种模型：事后私有化和事前私有化。在前者中，政府先开放市场，然后将上市公司私有化，而后者的政策顺序则相反。我们发现，当私营企业的外资所有权高（低）时，事前私有化会产生更高（更低）的私有化水平和更大（更小）的进入私营企业的均衡数量。我们还表明，在事前（事后）私有化案例中，外资所有权份额的最佳私有化水平是增加（减少）的。最后，我们发现，虽然事前和事后私有化案例产生了相同的消费者福利，但事前私有化总是比事后私有化产生更高的社会福利。
This study investigates the impact of the timing of privatization and liberalization policies on the degree of privatization and number of entering firms in free-entry mixed markets. We formulate two models:ex-postprivatization andex-anteprivatization. In the former, the government liberalizes the market and then privatizes the public firm, whereas the order of the policies is reversed in the latter. We find thatex-anteprivatization yields a higher (lower) level of privatization and a larger (smaller) equilibrium number of entering private firms when foreign ownership in private firms is high (low). We also show that the optimal level of privatization is increasing (decreasing) in the share of foreign ownership in theex-ante(ex-post) privatization case. Finally, we find that although both theex-anteand theex-postprivatization cases yield the same consumer welfare,ex-anteprivatization always yields higher social welfare thanex-postprivatization.