Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
复制标题
位置投票规则可操纵性的确切结果
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-007-0216-5
复制
发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Mark C. Wilson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Pritchard;Mark C. Wilson
我们考虑在一般评分规则下进行的3次选举，并得出精确的条件，以通过给定的选民联盟在战略上操纵特定的人声状况。给定选民情况的联盟。最多150个。对M的分布进行了完整的描述，将所有先前的工作概括为该主题。那些“在博尔达和抗年龄段之间”。
We consider 3-candidate elections under a general scoring rule and derive precise conditions for a given voting situation to be strategically manipulable by a given coalition of voters. We present an algorithm that makes use of these conditions to compute the minimum size M of a manipulating coalition for a given voting situation. The algorithm works for any voter preference model — here we present numerical results for IC and for IAC, for a selection of scoring rules, and for numbers of voters up to 150. A full description of the distribution of M is obtained, generalizing all previous work on the topic. The results obtained show interesting phenomena and suggest several conjectures. In particular we see that rules “between plurality and Borda” behave very differently from those “between Borda and antiplurality”.