Leader–follower equilibria to examine investment decisions in grid resilience‐enhancing measures
Leader–follower equilibria to examine investment decisions in grid resilience‐enhancing measures
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DOI：
10.1111/risa.13921
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发表时间：
2022-04
期刊：
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Chiara Lo Prete;Ashish Radhakrishnan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chiara Lo Prete;Ashish Radhakrishnan
大面积、持续时间长的停电在美国越来越常见，每年给经济造成数十亿美元的损失。制定增强电网复原力的战略需要了解预防和纠正行动的最佳组合、利己方作出复原力投资决策时出现的低效，以及监管机构可促进实现有效市场结果的条件。我们开发了一个双层模型来检查预防和纠正措施的组合，以增强电网对严重风暴的韧性。该模型代表了一种Stackelberg博弈，一方是可能在长时间停电前加固配电馈线和/或在中断后部署恢复人员的受监管公用事业公司(领导者)，另一方是对可靠电力有不同偏好的公用事业客户(追随者)，他们可能投资于备用发电机。我们表明，监管机构拒绝收回公用事业预防性支出的成本，加上私人目标和社会福利最大化之间的错位，导致弹性投资组合的显著低效。允许在预防措施中为公用事业公司的资本支出提供更高份额的成本回收，延长与损失成本回收相关的时间范围，并采用风暴恢复补偿机制，将实现的市场结果转向有效的解决方案。如果约五分之一的预防性弹性投资获得监管机构的批准，要求公用事业公司为每名客户支付365美元的3天停电补偿(约为美国公用事业公司目前提供的补偿水平的7倍)，将为更有效的预防性弹性投资提供重大激励。
Large‐area, long‐duration power outages are increasingly common in the United States, and cost the economy billions of dollars each year. Building a strategy to enhance grid resilience requires an understanding of the optimal mix of preventive and corrective actions, the inefficiencies that arise when self‐interested parties make resilience investment decisions, and the conditions under which regulators may facilitate the realization of efficient market outcomes. We develop a bi‐level model to examine the mix of preventive and corrective measures that enhances grid resilience to a severe storm. The model represents a Stackelberg game between a regulated utility (leader) that may harden distribution feeders before a long‐duration outage and/or deploy restoration crews after the disruption, and utility customers with varying preferences for reliable power (followers) who may invest in backup generators. We show that the regulator's denial of cost recovery for the utility's preventive expenditures, coupled with the misalignment between private objectives and social welfare maximization, yields significant inefficiencies in the resilience investment mix. Allowing cost recovery for a higher share of the utility's capital expenditures in preventive measures, extending the time horizon associated with damage cost recovery, and adopting a storm restoration compensation mechanism shift the realized market outcome toward the efficient solution. If about one‐fifth of preventive resilience investments is approved by regulators, requiring utilities to pay a compensation of $365 per customer for a 3‐day outage (about seven times the level of compensation currently offered by US utilities) provides significant incentives toward more efficient preventive resilience investments.