Acting as Intuitive Scientists: Contingency Judgments Are Made While Controlling for Alternative Potential Causes
Acting as Intuitive Scientists: Contingency Judgments Are Made While Controlling for Alternative Potential Causes
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充当直觉科学家：在控制其他潜在原因的同时做出应急判断
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Barbara A. Spellman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barbara A. Spellman
在判断一种结果的多个原因的有效性时，人类的表现被发现偏离了“规范的”ΔP偶发规则。然而，在多个原因的情况下，该规则可能不是规范的，例如，科学家和哲学家知道，当判断一个潜在原因时，一个人必须控制所有其他潜在原因。在一项实验中，他们被展示了两个潜在原因(有时是同时存在的)的逐次试验效果，受试者使用条件而不是无条件的偶然性来评估原因的效果。条件偶合分析可以解释文献中发现的各种“非规范”线索整合效应(例如，折现)，并与人们如何解开辛普森悖论有关。
In judging the efficacy of multiple causes of an effect, human performance has been found to deviate from the “normative”ΔP contingency rule However, in cases of multiple causes, that rule might not be normative, scientists and philosophers, for example, know that when judging a potential cause, one must control for all other potential causes. In an experiment in which they were shown trial-by-trial effects of two potential causes (which sometimes covaried), subjects used conditional rather than unconditional contingencies to rate the efficacy of the causes. A conditional contingency analysis may explain various “nonnormative” cue-integration effects (e.g., discounting) found in the literature and is relevant to how people unravel Simpson's paradox.