Constrained signaling for welfare and revenue maximization
Constrained signaling for welfare and revenue maximization
复制标题
福利和收入最大化的约束信号
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Aaron Roth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Dughmi;Nicole Immorlica;Aaron Roth
我们考虑拍卖设置中的卖方的数量和信息的性质，他可能会透露被出售的商品的限制。例如，这在在线广告拍卖中遇到，其中将每个观众的精确细节传达给感兴趣的广告商是不切实际的、昂贵的并且可能是社会上不期望的。我们开始研究约束信号在这样的设置，卖方必须选择哪些信息来揭示受外生约束的信号政策。我们认为卖方采用第二价格拍卖，目前的算法和硬度结果近似的福利和收入最大化的信号政策下的各种约束。
We consider auction settings where the seller is constrained in the amount and nature of information he may reveal about the good being sold. This is encountered, for example, in online advertising auctions, where communicating precise details of every viewer to interested advertisers is impractical, costly, and possibly socially undesirable. We initiate the study of constrained signaling in such settings, where a seller must choose which information to reveal subject to exogenous constraints on the signaling policy. We consider a seller employing the second-price auction, and present algorithms and hardness results for approximating the welfare and revenue maximizing signaling policies under a variety of constraints.