When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?
When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?
复制标题
政客们什么时候听取游说者的意见（当他们这样做时谁会受益）？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02062.x
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
BERNHAGEN P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BERNHAGEN P
本文提供了一个游说的信息模型的实证检验。该模型预测游说者何时向政策制定者提供有用信息，以及政策制定者何时遵循游说者的建议。这些预测是根据英国政府在2001年至2007年提出的28项政策建议的背景下，企业和其他有组织团体的政策立场和游说活动的数据进行评估的。研究结果表明，政策制定者和游说者之间的互动主要是由政策制定者的预期政策成本驱动的，这为游说者提供了强烈的激励，为政策制定者提供正确的建议。很少有人支持这样一种期望，即游说者能够成功地说服政策制定者采取有利于游说者的行动，而牺牲更广泛的选民。
This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.