Dynamic Competitive Equilibria in Electricity Markets
Dynamic Competitive Equilibria in Electricity Markets
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电力市场的动态竞争均衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
U. Shanbhag
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gui Wang;M. Negrete;Anupama Kowli;Ehsan Shafieepoorfard;Sean P. Meyn;U. Shanbhag
本章从一个理想化的竞争均衡环境出发，考虑到波动性以及输电和发电所固有的物理和运营约束，阐述了电力市场的经济理论。在一般的动态环境中，我们建立了竞争均衡理论的许多标准结论：市场均衡是有效的，平均价格与平均边际成本一致。然而，这些结论仅在平均水平上成立。本章的一个重要贡献是解释了电力价格的奇异行为。通过理论和例子，我们解释了为什么在竞争均衡中，价格的样本路径可以从负值到远远超过“阻塞”价格的值，这通常被认为是消费者愿意支付的最高价格。我们还发现，价格的方差可能很大，但这种方差随着需求响应的增加而减小。
This chapter addresses the economic theory of electricity markets, viewed from an idealized competitive equilibrium setting, taking into account volatility and the physical and operational constraints inherent to transmission and generation. In a general dynamic setting, we establish many of the standard conclusions of competitive equilibrium theory: Market equilibria are efficient, and average prices coincide with average marginal costs. However, these conclusions hold only on average. An important contribution of this chapter is the explanation of the exotic behavior of electricity prices. Through theory and examples, we explain why, in the competitive equilibrium, sample-paths of prices can range from negative values, to values far beyond the “choke-up” price—which is usually considered to be the maximum price consumers are willing to pay. We also find that the variance of prices may be very large, but this variance decreases with increasing demand response.