What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
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DOI：
10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.001
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发表时间：
2006-07-01
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Dawes, RM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dana, J;Cain, DM;Dawes, RM
我们使用简单的经济游戏来研究亲社会行为以及人们避免参与的长度。在两项研究中，我们发现大约三分之一的参与者愿意“退出”10美元的独裁者游戏，并拿走9美元。退出选项没有给接收者留下任何东西，但也确保了接收者永远不知道要玩独裁者游戏。因为大多数社会效用模型都是根据货币结果来定义的，所以它们无法解释在主导的10美元独裁者博弈中选择（9美元，0美元）的退出结果，因为这个博弈包括（10美元，0美元）和（9美元，1美元）的结果。我们还研究了使用“私人”独裁者游戏退出。在私人游戏中，接收者永远不知道游戏或从哪里收到任何钱。在这个游戏中的礼物被无害地添加到一个单独的任务支付。几乎没有独裁者退出私人游戏，表明接收者的信念是决定退出的关键因素。在私人游戏中，当接受者的信念和期望不能被退出所操纵时，退出很少被采用。我们的结论是，给予往往反映了一种不违背他人期望的愿望，而不是对他人福利本身的关注。我们讨论了我们的研究结果对理解道德决策和测试和建模社会偏好的影响。社会偏好的充分规范应该包括“心理”回报，直接将关于行动的信念纳入效用函数。(c)2005年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to "exit" a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a "private" dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers' beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers' beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others' expectations rather than a concern for others' welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include "psychological" payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.