More Arguing Than Bargaining? The Institutional Designs of the European Convention and Intergovernmental Conferences Compared
More Arguing Than Bargaining? The Institutional Designs of the European Convention and Intergovernmental Conferences Compared
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争论多于讨价还价？
DOI：
10.1080/07036330600853976
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
D. Panke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Panke
总的来说，尼斯政府间会议（IGC）在深化一体化方面并不成功。因此，所有的希望都转向了欧洲公约。根据建构主义文献中的一个普遍预期，《公约》的体制设计有利于在最低共同标准解决方案之上进行辩论和达成共识。另一方面，谈判主义方法假定，在所有体制环境中，谈判都有利于妥协，往往接近最低共同标准的结果。本文从理论上评估了制度变量对互动动态的影响，并实证说明了其主张。基于理性主义和建构主义之间的桥梁建设的方法，它确定的范围条件下，政体和政策变量有利于论证和共识或讨价还价和妥协。它的结论是，最突出的建构主义的制度变量，如透明度或多元化的行为者，是不太重要的欧洲公约的成就比政策变量。对体制设计的比较表明，公约比政府间会议更不利于辩论的动态。
Abstract Overall, the Nice Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was not a story of success in deepening integration. Therefore, all hopes shifted to the European Convention. According to a widely shared expectation in the constructivist literature, the Convention's institutional design facilitates argumentative discourses and consensus outcomes above lowest common denominator solutions. Rationalist approaches, on the other hand, assume for all institutional settings that bargaining is conducive to compromise, often close to lowest common denominator outcomes. This article theoretically assesses the impact of institutional variables on dynamics of interactions and illustrates its claims empirically. Based on a bridge–building approach between rationalists and constructivism, it identifies scope conditions under which polity and policy variables are conducive to argumentation and consensus or to bargaining and compromise. It concludes that the most prominent constructivist institutional variables, such as transparency or plurality of actors, were less important for the achievements of the European Convention than policy variables. The comparison of institutional designs reveals that Conventions are even less conducive to argumentative dynamics than Intergovernmental Conferences.