Intuitions in linguistics
Intuitions in linguistics
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DOI：
10.1093/bjps/axl017
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Devitt, Michael
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Devitt, Michael
语言学家把说话者的直觉判断作为语法的有力证据。为什么？乔姆斯基的答案是，它们是通过理性过程从语言规则在语言能力中的表现中派生出来的。这篇论文持不同的观点。它总体上主张一种自然主义的、非笛卡尔的直觉观点。它们是经验性的中央处理器对现象的反应，不同于其他此类反应，只是在即刻和相当不反思方面。将这一点应用于语言直觉，可以解释它们的证据作用，而不会诉诸于规则的表示。
Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an explanation of their evidential role without any appeal to the representation of rules.