Negative and positive integration in the political economy of European welfare states
Negative and positive integration in the political economy of European welfare states
复制标题
欧洲福利国家政治经济的消极和积极一体化
DOI:
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复制
发表时间:
1998
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
F. Scharpf
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
F. Scharpf
The process of European integration is characterized by a fundamental asymmetry, described accurately by Joseph Weiler (1981) as a dualism between supranational European law and intergovernmental European policy making. As Weiler (1994) points out, political scientists have for too long focused only on aspects of intergovernmental negotiations while largely ignoring the establishment, by judge-made law, of a European legal order with precedence over national law. This omission has kept us from recognizing the politically significant parallel between Weiler’s dualism and the more familiar contrast between ‘negative’ and ‘positive integration’ (Tinbergen, 1965; Rehbinder and Stewart, 1984), that is, between measures increasing market integration (by eliminating restraints on trade and distortions of competition) and common European policies to shape the conditions under which markets operate.