Layoffs and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Compensation: Does CEO Power Influence the Relationship?
Layoffs and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Compensation: Does CEO Power Influence the Relationship?
复制标题
裁员和首席执行官 (CEO) 薪酬：CEO 权力会影响这种关系吗？
DOI：
10.1177/0148558x1002500410
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. M. Sánchez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. C. Henderson;Adi Masli;V. Richardson;J. M. Sánchez
我们研究了裁员和首席执行官（CEO）薪酬之间的关联。由于公众的监督和政治压力与CEO的薪酬和裁员，我们预计公司会改变CEO的薪酬，减少奖金支付和增加股权为基础的薪酬裁员的幅度增加。与预测的替代一致，我们发现，随着裁员的加剧，CEO的奖金薪酬减少，他们的股权薪酬增加。当我们考虑这些薪酬调整是否随CEO权力的变化而变化时，我们发现，随着裁员幅度的增加，相对于权力较小的CEO，权力较大的CEO的奖金减少幅度较小，获得奖金的可能性更高，股权薪酬也相应增加。最后，我们报告的证据表明，裁员后的市场表现的公司领导的更强大的CEO是不上级的公司领导的不太强大的CEO。总的来说，研究结果表明，更强大的CEO提供的优惠薪酬安排是不符合有效的合同。相反，合并的结果与管理权力理论是一致的。
We examine the association between layoffs and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Because of the public scrutiny and political pressures associated with both CEO compensation and layoffs, we expect firms to alter CEO compensation by reducing bonus pay and increasing equity-based compensation as the magnitude of the layoff increases. Consistent with the predicted substitution, we find that as layoffs intensify, CEOs' bonus compensation decreases and their equity-based compensation increases. When we consider whether these compensation adjustments vary with CEO power, we find that as the layoff magnitude increases, relative to less powerful CEOs, more powerful CEOs experience smaller reductions in bonus pay, a higher likelihood of receiving a bonus, and comparable increases in equity compensation. Finally, we report evidence that post-layoff market performance of firms led by more powerful CEOs is not superior to that of firms led by less powerful CEOs. Collectively, the results suggest that the preferential compensation arrangements afforded more powerful CEOs is inconsistent with efficient contracting. Instead, the combined results are consistent with the managerial power theory.