Traffic Analysis Attacks on a Continuously-Observable Steganographic File System
Traffic Analysis Attacks on a Continuously-Observable Steganographic File System
复制标题
对连续可观察的隐写文件系统的流量分析攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Preneel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Troncoso;Claudia Díaz;O. Dunkelman;B. Preneel
连续观察到的隐形文件系统允许将用户文件远程存储在原始存储设备上；安全目标是即使攻击者不断监视原始存储设备，也可以提供合理的可否认性。周，庞和谭在[7]中提出了这样一个系统，声称可以证明安全性针对交通分析。在本文中，我们通过对Zhou等人的文件更新算法提出流量分析攻击来反驳他们的主张。我们的攻击在检测文件更新并揭示文件的存在和位置方面非常有效。对于多块文件，我们显示两个更新足以发现该文件。也可以揭示一个足够数量的访问的一个块文件。我们的结果表明，简单的随机化技术不足以保护地对文件系统免受交通分析攻击。
A continuously-observable steganographic file system allows to remotely store user files on a raw storage device; the security goal is to offer plausible deniability even when the raw storage device is continuously monitored by an attacker. Zhou, Pang and Tan have proposed such a system in [7] with a claim of provable security against traffic analysis. In this paper, we disprove their claims by presenting traffic analysis attacks on the file update algorithm of Zhou et al. Our attacks are highly effective in detecting file updates and revealing the existence and location of files. For multi-block files, we show that two updates are sufficient to discover the file. One-block files accessed a sufficient number of times can also be revealed. Our results suggest that simple randomization techniques are not sufficient to protect steganographic file systems from traffic analysis attacks.