ON BENNETTS SPINOZA: THE ISSUE OF TELEOLOGY
ON BENNETTS SPINOZA: THE ISSUE OF TELEOLOGY
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论贝内茨·斯宾诺莎：目的论问题
DOI：
10.1163/9789004246638_005
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发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
E. Curley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Curley
班尼特的《斯宾诺莎伦理学研究》的书套上有一段引自G. H. R.帕金森称赞它是“我很长一段时间以来读过的关于斯宾诺莎的最令人兴奋的书。写得很有智慧，清晰和热情。一本激励人心的书，会让读者思考”。班尼特对斯宾诺莎的研究无疑将被定性为一部“分析哲学史”。其中班尼特的最引人注目的结论是他声称斯宾诺莎否认所有的目的论：班尼特的斯宾诺莎不仅坚持认为上帝从不为了目的而行动，他也不认为任何存在都是这样，身心同一性理论在斯宾诺莎那里的一个目的就是让他吃到自己的蛋糕（排除对所有物理事件进行完全物理主义解释的可能性），也吃它（允许人类行动层面的目的论）。关键词：分析历史;班尼特;防尘套;帕金森;哲学;斯宾诺莎;目的论
The dust jacket of Bennett's Study of Spinoza's Ethics bears a quotation from G.H.R. Parkinson praising it as "the most exciting book on Spinoza that I have read for a long time. written with great intelligence, lucidity and verve. a stimulating book, which will make its readers think". Bennett's study of Spinoza will no doubt be characterized as a piece of "analytic history of philosophy". One of Bennett's most striking conclusions is his claim that Spinoza denies all teleology: not only does Bennett's Spinoza maintain that God never acts for the sake of an end, he does not think that any being does, including man. One purpose which the theory of mind-body identity serves in Spinoza is to let him have his cake (posit the possibility of a completely physicalistic explanation of all physical events) and eat it too (allow for teleology at the level of human action). Keywords: analytic history; Bennett; dust jacket; Parkinson; philosophy; Spinoza; teleology