Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity
Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity
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理解我们自己：自我叙述和个人身份
DOI：
10.1007/s11097-014-9358-y
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
L. Baker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Baker
有些哲学家认为个人同一性是自我叙述的问题。相反，我认为自我叙事观点不能单独作为个人（或数字）身份的观点。首先，我考虑丹尼特的自我叙事观点，根据这一观点，自我是虚构的人物--抽象的，就像重力中心--由大脑产生。从意向性的立场来看，神经活动被解释为产生一个故事。我认为这是难以置信的。这种不足被丹尼特对“我们”的模糊使用所掩盖：有时“我们”指的是真实的人类，有时“我们”指的是自我或虚构的人物。其次，我认为谢茨曼的观点，自我叙述创造人（在这个意义上，她称之为“表征”或人格。我认为，自我叙事创造一个人的意义不能独立存在：一个人必须已经存在（在数字身份的意义上），才能有自我叙事。最后，我提供了我自己的个人账户。
Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real human beings, and sometimes ‘us’ refers to selves or fictional characters. Second, I consider Schechtmann’s view that self-narratives create persons (in the sense that she calls ‘characterization’ or personality. I argue that the sense in which a self-narrative creates a person cannot stand on its own: a person must already exist (in the sense of numerical identity) in order for there to be a self-narrative. Finally, I offer my own account of persons.