The incentives of China's urban land finance
The incentives of China's urban land finance
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DOI：
10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.08.015
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
7.1
通讯作者：
Wu Qun;Yongle Li;Yang Siqi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wu Qun;Yongle Li;Yang Siqi
土地出让金和土地税收收入已成为我国城市政府财政收入的两大来源。这种城市政府的财政收入策略通常被称为“土地财政”，近年来引起了越来越多的研究关注。本文探讨了我国城市政府“土地财政”战略的制度成因。我们首先分析了“土地财政”的制度基础（包括中国的城市土地使用制度和土地征用制度）。然后，我们提出了两个假设的制度原因的“土地财政”。第一个假设是，现行的财政分权体制是城市政府选择“土地财政”财政战略的主要原因。第二个假设是，在以地方经济绩效为最重要考核指标的现行人事管理体制下，城市政府之间为促进地方经济增长而展开的竞争，是城市政府选择“土地财政”财政战略的另一个重要原因。我们使用1999-2008年31个省级地区的数据，通过估计计量经济模型来检验假设。实证结果表明，财政分权和城市政府间促进经济增长的竞争是“土地财政”的两个主要原因。
Land grant premiums and land tax revenues have become two major sources of fiscal revenue for city governments in China. This type of fiscal revenue strategy for city governments is generally referred to as “land finance”, and it has drawn increasing research attention in recent years. This paper explores the institutional causes of the “land finance” strategy of city governments in China. We first analyze the institutional foundation of “land finance” (including China's urban land use system and land expropriation system). We then propose two hypotheses about the institutional causes of “land finance”. The first hypothesis is that the current system of fiscal decentralization is a major reason city governments choose the “land finance” fiscal strategy. The second hypothesis is that under the current personnel control system, which uses local economic performance as the most important indicator for evaluating local government officials, the competition between city governments to promote local economic growth is another major reason city governments choose the “land finance” fiscal strategy. We test the hypotheses by estimating econometric models using data for 31 provincial-level regions for the period 1999–2008. The empirical results suggest that fiscal decentralization and competition between city governments to promote economic growth are two major causes of “land finance”.