Supplier certification and quality investment in supply chains
Supplier certification and quality investment in supply chains
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DOI：
10.1002/nav.21527
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发表时间：
2013-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ying‐ju Chen;Mingcherng Deng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ying‐ju Chen;Mingcherng Deng
全球采购使质量管理成为一项更具挑战性的任务，供应商认证已成为克服供应商产品质量信息优势的解决方案。本文分析了当买方外包生产过程时，认证标准对供应商质量投资的影响。根据我们的结果，确定性认证可能会导致高效供应商对质量改进技术的投资不足，从而导致潜在的供应链效率低下。当信息不对称的成本很高时，引入噪音认证可能会缓解这种投资不足的问题。虽然允许嘈杂的认证总是使买方能够提供一个菜单来筛选异类供应商，但买方最好只选择有限数量的认证标准。我们的分析提供了买方应为异构供应商使用的认证机构类型的清晰预测，并且我们确定了供应商从嘈杂的认证中受益的条件。 © 2013 Wiley periodicals, Inc. 海军研究后勤，2013
Global sourcing has made quality management a more challenging task, and supplier certification has emerged as a solution to overcome suppliers' informational advantage about their product quality. This article analyzes the impact of certification standards on the supplier's investment in quality, when a buyer outsources the production process. Based on our results, deterministic certification may lead to under‐investment in quality improvement technology for efficient suppliers, thereby leading to potential supply chain inefficiency. The introduction of noisy certification may alleviate this under‐investment problem, when the cost of information asymmetry is high. While allowing noisy certification always empowers the buyer to offer a menu to screen among heterogeneous suppliers, the buyer may optimally choose only a limited number of certification standards. Our analysis provides a clear‐cut prediction of the types of certifiers the buyer should use for heterogeneous suppliers, and we identify the conditions under which the supplier benefits from noisy certification. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013