Government-induced Production Commitment vs. Import-Tariff under Endogenous Entry of Foreign Firms
Government-induced Production Commitment vs. Import-Tariff under Endogenous Entry of Foreign Firms
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外国企业内生进入下的政府诱导生产承诺与进口关税
DOI：
10.1080/09638199.2020.1746385
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Akira Miyaoka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hiroaki Ino;Akira Miyaoka
各国政府通常对国内生产有直接或间接的控制，以发展或保护对外国公司具有成本劣势的国内产业。当国内企业面临外国企业的自由进入时，我们研究了这种生产控制政策的福利效应。我们认为，生产控制政策是政府引导国内企业在外国进入之前承诺一定的目标产出水平，并将由此产生的国内社会福利与进口关税下的社会福利进行比较。我们发现，当产品同质时，即使生产控制政策的目的是最大化国内行业利润而不是整体国内福利，但生产控制政策产生的国内福利高于任何水平的进口关税。我们还表明，当产品差异化时，生产控制政策的优势关键取决于产品差异化的程度。这一结果表明，即使在开放国内市场之后，保持政府对国内生产的控制也是有好处的，尤其是对同质产品而言。
Governments often have direct or indirect control over domestic production to develop or protect their domestic industries that have cost disadvantages against foreign firms. We investigate the welfare effects of such a production control policy when domestic firms face the free entry of foreign firms. We consider the production control policy as the government inducing domestic firms to commit to some target output levels before the foreign entry, and compare the resulting domestic social welfare with that under an import tariff. We show that when the products are homogeneous, the production control policy yields higher domestic welfare than any level of import tariff, even if the production control policy aims to maximize domestic industry profits rather than overall domestic welfare. We also show that when the products are differentiated, the superiority of the production control policy crucially depends on the degree of product differentiation. The results suggest a benefit of maintaining the government's control over domestic production even after opening the domestic market, particularly for homogeneous products.