Tax competition, unemployment, and intergovernmental transfers
Tax competition, unemployment, and intergovernmental transfers
复制标题
税收竞争、失业和政府间转移支付
DOI：
10.1007/s10797-019-09533-0
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Toshiki Tamai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuya Kikuchi;Toshiki Tamai
本文考察了劳动力市场不完善条件下税收竞争、公共物品供给均衡效率和政府间转移支付之间的关系。劳动力市场的不完善导致失业输出的外部性，除了财政外部性。其中一个关键点是失业输出的外部性可以是正外部性，也可以是负外部性。转移必须将这两种不同的外部性内在化，以有效地提供公共产品。我们考虑了三种具体的转移：税基均等化、税收均等化和基于GDP的均等化。研究表明，在存在两种正外部性的情况下，税基均等化比收入均等化更能有效地提高公共产品的供给效率。相反，如果同时存在正外部性和负外部性，税收均等化可能优于税基均等化。这意味着这两种选择在某些情况下无法消除总体外部影响。我们证明，在现实情况下，基于GDP的均衡化可以完美地内部化两种不同的外部性。
This paper investigates the relationship among tax competition, the equilibrium efficiency of providing public goods, and intergovernmental transfers, under labor market imperfections. Labor market imperfections cause unemployment-exporting externalities, in addition to fiscal externalities. One of the key points is the unemployment-exporting externality can be either a positive or negative externality. A transfer must internalize these two different externalities to provide public goods efficiently. We consider three specific transfers: tax base equalization, tax revenue equalization, and GDP-based equalization. This paper shows that tax base equalization is more effective than revenue equalization in improving the efficiency of public goods supply if two positive externalities are present. In contrast, tax revenue equalization may be better than tax base equalization if both positive and negative externalities are present. This implies that these two options fail to eliminate the overall external effect in some cases. We demonstrate that in a realistic situation, GDP-based equalization can internalize two different externalities perfectly.